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The population of organization studies  that  has become known under such
names as population ecology and organizational ecology (OE), is entering the
stage of maturity. It  is argued here that this branch of organization studies can
increase the carrying capacity of its  niche by seeking cross-fertilization with
the century-old field of industrial organization and the economically inspired
sub-field of strategic  management. Doing so would enrich  the  study of the
long-run evolution of organizational populations by adding a focus on differ-
ences between and within industries to OE’s  emphasis on universal similarities.
The argument is  illustrated by investigating the long-run development of the
German and U.S.  brewing industries  on the one hand and the  Dutch audit
industry on the other.
Descriptors:  organizational ecology, industrial organization, market
evolution, dual market structure and audit industry
Introduction
The publication of Hannan and Freeman’s Organizational Ecology in
1989 marks a transition from adolescence to maturity in  the develop-
ment of a 15-year old population of organization studies. Hannan and
Freeman co-authored the article ’Population Ecology of Organizations’
in  the  1977 issue of the American Journal of Sociology which gave
name to a new research programme in organization theory: organiza-
tional ecology (OE). Their book summarizes the progress made  to date.
OE  is inspired by careful analogies from biological population ecology.
The  perspective  of  the  theory  is  dynamic:  OE  focuses  on  the
development  of  (populations  of)  organizational  forms  over  time.
With its Darwinian perspective, the key issue is selection. What  differ-
entiates OE  from its companions in the field of organization studies, is
the focus on the population as the prime level of analysis.  It  is not so
much  the (behaviour in and of) an individual organization that matters,
but  rather  the  interaction among groups of (adjacent)  organizational
forms.
By now an evaluation of the contribution and potential of OE  is justi-
fied. OE  has been criticized on a number of fundamental grounds. The
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aim of  this paper  is not so much  to add another critique to the organiza-
tional literature, but rather to present a search for potential synergies by
identifying issues where  cross-fertilization is likely to produce progress.
To be precise, this paper argues that OE  uses economic concepts such
as competition, and  is often likened to economic  analysis. The  economic
theories considered  are  industrial  organization  and  the  economically
inspired sub-field of strategic management (henceforth referred  to  as
10).  This means that  we largely  ignore  evolutionary  economics,  as
Winter  (1990)  is the eminent source of  a review of  the OE -  evolution-
ary economics interface.  Moreover, we focus on economic theories of
organizational behaviour because the close ties between OE  on the one
hand  and  non-economic  approaches  to  the  study  of  organizational
behaviour on the other are already well-documented [the (co-authored)
work of Aldrich is  illustrative: avant la  lettre by Aldrich and Pfeffer
1976;  and subsequently by Aldrich  et  al.  1984;  Aldrich  and Auster
1986; and Aldrich 1991].
The paper is  organized as follows. The next section summarizes the
fundamentals of OE, primarily on the  basis of Hannan and Freeman
(1989) and Hannan and Carroll (1992). The argument proceeds in the
following section by summarizing two important criticisms raised by
organizational scholars, and the fourth section is  an intermezzo which
briefly evaluates the current state-of-the-art. Unlike some authors whu
question  the  applicability  of ecological  models to  organizations, we
argue that considerable progress can be made by adding insights from
industrial organization and strategic management to OE. This issue  I,
examined in  the  fifth  section.  The final  section  is  an  appraisal.  We
conclude that  the potential of OE  is  impressive, particularly  if future
work integrates important contributions from 10.
Fundamentals  of Organizational Ecology 
,<.;  I  ’, ’ 
~ 
’
OE  focuses on the dynamics of the world of organizations. The aim of
understanding changes in organizational forms is  to give an answer to
the simple but fundamental question: why are there so many different
kinds of organizations? (Hannan and Freeman 1977). OE  distinguishes
three levels of analysis to explore the sources of organizational divers-
ity.  The first  level  deals with the demography of organizations:  rates
of change, particularly founding and mortality rates,  in  organizational  I
populations are the central interest. The next level concerns the popula-  I
tion  ecology  of  organizations:  vital  rates  between  populations  are
linked. The third level is  the community ecology of organizations: the
central issue is how  the links between and among  populations affect the
sustainability  of  the  community  as  a  whole  (Hannan  and  Freeman
1989). It  is  fair to say that most of the work done so far concerns the
first (demographic)  level. Although few  studies are located at the second
level, hardly any could aspire to be a third-level study. In the following
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we therefore focus our discussion, with few exceptions, on first-level
research.
It  is  important to mention that the diversity of forms is a property of a
population (or  a community) of organizations (Hannan and Freeman
1989). At first glance, it may  be confusing that studies in the OE  tradi-
tion use data on  individual organizations to analyze developments  at the
population level. However, if a particular organizational characteristic
affects the vital  rates,  then, of course, these very processes ultimately
determine the prevalence of that characteristic at  the population level.
In other words, the interest is  not so much in explaining the vital rates
per  se, but rather in tracing aggregate rates at  the population level and
understanding the implications of mortality and founding processes for
the distribution of organizational characteristics (i.e.  diversity).
How  does the long-run diversity of organizational forms come about?
Two  main perspectives, both based on a biological evolutionary meta-
phor of  organizations (Davis and Stout 1992), can be distinguished: (1)
organizations continuously fine-tune  their  strategies and structures  to
changing environmental  circumstances 
-  which  is  the  Lamarckian
view 
-  and  (2)  old  forms  die  and  are  replaced  by new forms 
-
reflecting  the  Darwinian  perspective  (Hannan  and  Freeman
1989).
The  first perspective is not realistic according  to OE  because OE  theory
assumes that  organizations are  characterized by relative  inertia:  they
react rather slowly to changes in the environment (Hannan and Freeman
1984). This  is  not to  say  that  organizations never change, but rather
that, if radical transformation is needed, organizations are hard pressed
to implement the necessary changes. The required changes are rare and
occur only after considerable delays, so organizations tend to be inert
relative to environmental changes. The assumption of relative  inertia
separates OE  from many  other organizational theories which emphasize
adaptability, a case in point being the focus on strategic fine-tuning in
standard  textbooks  on  strategic  management  (such  as  Johnson  and
Scholes 1993). An example of an argument in  favour of the opposite
view is Frederickson and Iaquinto (1989). Furthermore, even if organ-
izations would be  relatively  flexible,  the  validity  of the  Lamarckian
view  depends  upon  whether  rational  and  planned  organizational
changes are possible at  all.  According to Hannan and Freeman (1989),
controlled change is  problematic due to the unpredictability of future
environmental  states,  the  political  nature  of organizational  decision
making and the decoupling of intentions and organizational outcomes.
The arguments of relative  inertia and/or uncontrollability of organiza-
tional change imply that every match at a given point in time between
the environment and organizational form  can be considered, on average,
as random (Hannan and Freeman 1989).  In other words, the environ-
ment  selects  organizational  forms.  Because  of  relative  inertia,  the
dynamics of diversity can be understood by looking at  the birth  and
death of organizational forms.
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Three arguments are put forward to defend the assumption of relative
inertia  (Hannan and Freeman 1984).  First,  organizations need to  be
reliable: organizations can be reliable suppliers of goods and services
(for example, in terms of quality and delivery time) because they have
developed  routines  which  direct  their  activities.  Routines  can  be
retained within organizations, but not in ad hoc groups of  varying com-
position. Compared to ad hoc groups of skilled workers, organizations
will tend to produce with less variance in the quality of performance.
Second, organizations can more easily  be held accountable for  their
actions and performance. Much  (though not all) sociology argues that,
in the modern  world, decisions and  actions must  be explained in rational
terms. Accountability is also facilitated by stable rules and procedures,
which are more easily developed and retained within organizations than
within ad hoc collectives. Third, organizational reliability and account-
ability  require  that  organizational  structures  are  highly  reproducible.
The  routines,  rules  and  procedures  that  determine  reliability  and
accountability must stay in place. That is, the structure of  roles, author-
ity and communication must be reproducible from day to day. Selection
pressures will work in  this direction.  Rigid and viable  blueprints  are
selected  (Boeker  1988),  so  selection  will  favour organizations  with
highly  inert  structures:  relative  inertia  is  not only a precondition of
selection, but also a consequence.
The effects of reliability, accountability and reproducibility sum up to
the argument that
’[t]he modern world favors collective actors that can demonstrate or at  last
reasonably claim a capacity for reliable performance and can account rationally
for their actions. So  it  favors organizations over other kinds of collectives and
favors certain kinds of organizations over others, since not  all  organizations
have these properties in equal measure. Selection within organizational popula-
tions tends to eliminate organizations with low reliability and accountability.
... Thus we assume that selection in populations of organizations in modern
societies favors forms with high reliability of performance and high levels of
accountability.’ (Hannan and Freeman 1989: 74)
Until  now,  most  theoretical  and  empirical  work  has  focused  on
explaining the striking similarity of the growth trajectories of very (if
not radically) different organizational populations, varying from bank,
and breweries to labour unions and voluntary social-service organiza-
tions.  The number of organizations  in  a  population  typically  grows
slowly initially, and then increases rapidly to a peak. Once the peak is
reached, there is usually a sharp decline and occasionally stabilization
(Carroll and Hannan 1989).
(The development of) the number of organizations within a population
depends on various factors. First of all, the niche in which the popula-
tion resides is crucial. A  niche expresses the population’s role and func-
tion  in  a community. An important feature of a niche is  its  carrying
capacity (that  is,  its  maximum size).  Social  and material  restrictions
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limit  the  extent  to  which particular  roles  and functions  are  needed.
The carrying capacity of a  niche only represents an upper bound on
aggregate  activity  performed  by  a  particular  organizational  form.
Exogenous  factors  determine  the  carrying  capacity  of  populations.
The striking similarity of growth trajectories of populations, however,
suggests that  there  is  an intrinsic dynamic of contraction and expan-
sion  (Carroll  1984).  This growth  pattern  can  be  explained  by two
forces:  competition  and legitimation.  It  is  assumed that  both forces
depend on the  density  of the  population.  Broadly speaking,  density
expresses the  degree  to  which the  carrying capacity  of the  niche  is
’filled’.  OE studies usually take  the  number of organizations  as  the
measure of density.
Competition  is  a  core  concept  in  economics.  Competition within  a
population or among populations occurs if resources within the niche
are scarce. Legitimation is primarily a sociological concept. Basically,
legitimation refers to the social acceptance of the organizational form,
new  forms  having  low  legitimacy.  As  they  perform  reliably  and
accountably over time, they may  acquire higher legitimacy. Shifts in the
relative  importance of competition and legitimation induce dynamics
in the constellation of a population:  the number of organizations in a
population changes over time. More  specifically, OE  assumes that both
competition and legitimation increase with the aging of the organiza-
tional form. On the one hand, a new form has to  acquire legitimacy
over time. Hence, the  expectation  is  that  the  founding rates  increase
with age. On  the other hand, as more organizations come  to inhabit the
niche, competition within the population will  increase, leading to the
expectation that this rivalry will be negatively associated with founding
rates.  Analogous reasoning predicts that  the  mortality  rate  is  high at
first  (liability  of newness and insufficient legitimacy), then falls with
increasing density up to a point (in the neighbourhood of the carrying
capacity)  and  then  rises  with  increasing  density  (due  to  intensified
competition). In the language of  OE: competition and  legitimation cause
nonmonotonic density dependence in  the vital  rates. That is,  the  rela-
tionship  between density  and  the  founding rate  has the  form of an
inverted U. The relationship between density  and the  mortality  rate,
however, has a U-shape (Hannan and Carroll 1992).
The nonmonotonic  density dependence  in vital rates has been confirmed
by an ever increasing number of empirical studies  in  a  diversity  of
populations, for example, breweries, labour unions, newspapers, semi-
conductor producers, life-insurance companies and banks  (Carroll 1988;
Hannan and Carroll  1992).  However, some studies  show discrepant
findings  (Delacroix et  al.  1989;  Barnett and Amburgey 1990).  More
specifically, a review by Singh and Lumsden (1990) suggests that find-
ings concerning founding rates are more consistent with nonmonotonic
density dependence than those concerning mortality  rates.  Singh and
Lumsden (1990) argue that more research is  necessary to reconciliate
these divergent findings. We  agree with these authors, who  suggest that
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(1990:  179) ‘(t]here may be systematic differences across populations
in patterns of density dependence of mortality areas’.
To  explain the apparent drop  in the density of  populations after reaching
a peak, OE  introduces another mechanism: density delay. That is,  den-
sity at the time of founding has a persistent positive effect on mortality
rates (Carroll and Hannan 1989). Density delay causes mortality rates
to be particularly high after a population has reached its  peak: so the
number of organizations then starts to drop. Empirical research indeed
shows that building a new  organization in tightly-packed niches results  I
in the so-called ’liability of resource scarcity’.  It  should be mentioned
that contemporaneous  density, and density at founding, are not the only
independent variables used by OE  to explain the vital rates. Other  vari-
ables that are normally incorporated into the empirical models are exo-
genous factors  reflecting economic conditions,  institutional  changes,
political turmoils, organization size (liability of  smallness), organization
age (liability of newness), etc.  Important is  that the effects of density
remain significant  after controlling for those covariates.  Furthermore,
the mortality rates are higher for smaller and younger, as opposed to
larger and older, organizations, as expected (for a review see Singh and
Lumsden 1990).
Key Recurrent Criticisms of Organizational Ecology
Before identifying issues where  cross-fertilization with industrial organ-
ization and the economically-inspired branch of strategic management
is  likely  to produce progress, we shortly discuss two recurrent points
of criticism:  definition problems and the issue of determinism versus
voluntarism. This discussion allows us to take position in an ongoing
debate,  and to  clarify  a  number of,  as we see  it,  misunderstandings
concerning the assumptions of OE.
Definition Problems
Analyzing the dynamics of  organizational populations requires a defini-
tion of populations and a procedure for separating one population from
the other. OE  makes the assumption that populations can be defined in
such a way that they have a unitary character. According to Hannan
and Freeman (1989: 45),  ’[t]he most salient kind of unitary character
for  our concerns  is  common dependence on the  material  and social
environment’. The concept of organizational form (or species) is  intro-
duced  to  provide  this  unitary  character  to  a  population.  Form  (or
species) is  defined as ’a  blueprint for organizational action, for trans-
forming inputs into outputs’ (Hannan and Freeman 1977: 935), which  I
is  akin  to  the  concept of routines  in  behavioural theory  (Cyert  and
March 1963) and evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter 1982).
This leads to the following definition of populations:  ’a population of
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organizations consists of  all the organizations within a particular bound-
ary  that  have  a  common form’  (Hannan and Freeman  1977:  936).
Unfortunately,  the  main criterion  to  discriminate  species  in  biology,
interbreeding,  is  of no use  for  organizational  analysis.  For instance,
mergers and  joint ventures between all sorts of firms are observable in
the real world, not to speak of the increasing incidence of networking
(Powell 1990). How  can conglomerate firms be fitted into a classifica-
tion of populations? In fact, the absence of a clear-cut criterion has led
to  considerable  confusion  (Betton  and  Dess  1985).  Consider,  for
example, the study of Freeman and Hannan (1983), in which two types
of  restaurants  are  distinguished:  specialists  and  generalists.  Should
specialists be regarded as a species different from generalists, or should
those restaurants be viewed as one population consisting of two mani-
festations of  the same  form’? Theoretically, these issues are very difficult
to solve (Hannan and Freeman 1989). It  is therefore not surprising that,
in practice, OE  studies generally focus on populations which are readily
acceptable  as  distinct  (for  example,  breweries,  labour  unions  and
newspapers).
Carroll (1984) argues that Freeman and Hannan (1983) are inclined to
equate differences in organizational forms with differences in organiza-
tional  strategies,  such as specialism versus generalism. According to
Carroll, this is unwarranted because there  is  no reason to assume that
forms, which represent structures,  and strategies  are  tightly  coupled.
Hannan and Freeman (1989: 64) acknowledge this and stress that  ’it  is
important to  retain the  distinction between forms of concrete entities
whose boundaries are  created  and retained by technological  factors,
collective action, and institutional processes, and higher-order abstrac-
tions characterizing one or another dimension of a set of forms’. In our
view, this implies that organizations with different strategies belong to
the same population, as long as they exhibit the same environmental
dependencies.
We  agree with Hannan and Freeman (1989) that these definition issues
have to be dealt with in  future research in order to be able to extend
the research programme beyond the dynamics of populations with non-
controversial boundaries. However, we  should not be too optimistic in
this respect. The problem is extremely complicated because boundaries
of populations can change over time. However, we do not agree with
the critique of Young  (1988) that OE  is not a useful paradigm because
of, among  other things, difficulties in unequivocally adapting biological
concepts to  organizations.  Such definition  problems are  not  idiosyn-
cratic to OE. On  the contrary: for instance, a very similar discussion 
-
lasting several decades 
-  has taken place in the industrial organization
and strategic management literatures concerning the definition of mar-
kets and/or industries (for a summary see Jegers 1987; and Abell 1980,
respectively). The issue of market definition 
-  in both 10 theory and
antitrust  practice 
-  has been settled by agreeing upon a number of
pragmatic rules-of-thumb such as threshold values of cross-elasticities
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(if measurable) and well-established SIC categories (Scherer and Ross
1990). The  bottom line is, in our  view, that this debate has not generated
new  scientific insights. As another example, Hatten and Hatten (1987:
329) define strategic groups as follows: ’A  strategic group is a grouping
of organizations which pursue similar strategies with similar resources.
Note the  word &dquo;grouping&dquo;:  groups do not  exist ...  it  is  merely an
analytical convenience’. The point is  that there would be no organiza-
tion  theory  left  if evaluations were mainly based on too demanding
conceptual rigour.
Determinism versus Voluntarism
OE  has frequently been criticized by strategic management  scholars for
being  overly deterministic and neglecting the free will of  managers  (see,
e.g., Astley and Van  de Ven 1983; Bourgeois 1984). However, Hannan
and Freeman (1989) argue that determinism is  not at  all  the opposite
of  voluntarism. Indeed, it  is not because OE  assumes that natural selec-
tion causes diversity in organizational forms  that managers do not make
choices, change strategies and even try  to adapt their organizations to
changing environmental conditions.  As Hannan and Freeman (1989:
22) put it,  ‘[e)ven when actors strive to cope with their environments,
action may  be random  with respect to adaptation as long as the environ-
ments are highly uncertain or the connections between means and ends
are  not well understood.  It  is  the match between action and environ-
mental outcomes that must be random on average for selection models
to apply’. OE  is only ’deterministic’, therefore, in the sense that long-
run organizational survival is mainly determined by environmental con-
ditions.’  This implies  that  OE questions the  ’great  man’ theories  of
organizational history.
A  more fundamental issue is which assumption is more valid: relative
inertia (OE), which is  a prerequisite for Darwinian selection to occur,
or relative flexibility (strategic management), reflecting the Lamarckian
view. We  agree with Young (1988) that the OE  assumption of relative
inertia has not, as yet, been seriously verified. However, this is also the
case for relative flexibility, which has been taken for granted by many
strategic management  scholars (Johnson and Scholes 1993). More  spec-
ifically,  it  is assumed that managers scan the environment, being able
to continuously fine-tune the  strategy and structure of their organiza-
tions in accordance with environmental changes. The latter implies that
organizational  diversity  is  mainly  the  consequence of organizational
change. Although the views of both ’camps’ differ substantially at first
glance,  considerable  overlap  can  be  observed when looking  at  the
behavioural theory of strategic decision-making processes. A  recent art-
icle by Miller (1993) suggests that even ’excellent’  organizations are
not immune to environmental selection.
Miller  argues  that  successful  organizations  become  increasingly
‘simple’ over time, which may  ultimately lead to organizational failure.
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Miller (1993:  119) offers three reasons for this dangerous simplicity.
More specifically:
’First,  individual managerial, cultural, structural, and process factors provoke
simplicity.  Such factors  include  organizational  learning;  the  &dquo;natural  selec-
tion&dquo;  of values,  heroes,  and  skills;  and  confining  programs and  routines.
Second, these factors tend to interact, generating increasingly pure and simple
corporate configurations 
-  constellations that become ever more aligned with
a single dominant theme and less tolerant of deviation or variation. Third, a
troublesome paradox exists: the sources of dangerous simplicity may underlie
initial success and, thus, may be doubly difficult to combat. Indeed, it  is  very
hard  to  distinguish  between the  concentration  and passionate dedication so
necessary for success and competitive advantage and the simplistic fixations
and extremes that lead to failure.’
Obviously, the theory of  the dynamics  of  strategic decision-making  pro-
cesses  offered  by  Miller  (1993)  is  perfectly  compatible  with  the
assumptions of OE.
In our view, however, a frequently neglected possibility  is  that inertia
and flexibility are not necessarily the opposites on a continuum. In an
insightful paper, Burgelman (1991) argues that organizations can con-
sistently  remain  successful  by  a  carefully  balanced  strategy-making
approach consisting of inertia and flexibility.  Burgelman (1991) uses
an intra-organizational ecological perspective on strategy making. He
distinguishes two  kinds of  strategic processes: induced and autonomous.
Induced strategic initiatives fit within the current strategy, routines and
goals of  the organization and are compatible with the current distinctive
competence. The internal selection of such initiatives by top managers
reflects current external selection pressures. This process, however, only
allows an organization to adapt to  incremental environmental change
and  is therefore tantamount to relative inertia. Burgelman (1991) argues
that  induced processes are  necessary to  build on past success and to
exploit the opportunities associated with the current domain. To  achieve
long-run survival, however, induced processes should be balanced with
autonomous  strategic processes. The  latter refer to the internal selection
of strategic  initiatives  outside  the  scope of the  current  strategy.  An
important task of top management is  to nurture such operational-level
strategic initiatives. Autonomous  processes, when  funded and supported
by  top  management,  allow  continuous  strategic  renewal  and  offer
organizations possibilities for anticipatory adaptation. The point is that
the long-run survival of firms is  enhanced by the  ’balancing of vari-
ation-reduction and variation-increasing mechanisms.  It  suggests  that
one process leads to relative inertia and incremental adjustments, while
the other expands the firm’s domain and renews the organization’s dis-
tinctive competence base, countering inertia and serving some of the
functions of reorientation’ (Burgelman 1991: 257). The fact that several
organizations start-up  new, decentralized plants  to  allow  the  internal
development  of  products  outside their current domain  is a clear example
 at Tilburg University on February 22, 2012 oss.sagepub.com Downloaded from 274
of  such  anticipated renewal  behaviour. That  is, some  organizations seem
to be able to develop r-outines for change.
The recent contribution by Burgelman (1991) is an interesting example
of a theory of organizational change that nicely develops the OE  argu-
ment beyond the simple assumption of relative  inertia.  ’Mainstream’
OE predicts  that  organizational  change,  if  it  is  possible  at  all,  will
increase the failure rate. The reason is  that adaptation by changing the
core features of an organization can be considered as creating a new
organization.  As  a  consequence,  organizational  changes  ’[t]end  to
&dquo;reset the clock&dquo;, exposing  the organization once again to the &dquo;liability
of newness&dquo; ’  (Swaminathan and Delacroix 1991: 681). Several find-
ings, however, suggest that change does not increase failure rates (Kelly
and  Amburgey  1991)  or  even  enhance  survival  in  the  long  run
(Amburgey et  al.  1990; Swaminathan and Delacroix  1991; Haveman
1992). Particularly important is the conclusion of Kelly and Amburgey
(1991:  609), studying cumulative change,  that  ’as  organizations gain
experience with change, they may develop routines to handle it so that
change itself becomes routinized’.
These interesting findings suggest that organizational change, as a driv-
ing  force  of organizational  diversity,  needs more attention  (see  also
Singh and Lumsden 1990) and that some organizations are better able
to change than others. Note that a similar paradox 
-  labelled commit-
ment  versus  flexibility  - is well-known  in  industrial  organization
(Ghemawat 1991). What  matters is which  features characterize adaptive
organizations (Kelly and Amburgey 1991), and which environmental
conditions enhance successful adaptation (Haveman 1992). We think
that the first step towards bringing both ’camps’ together is incorporat-
ing other individual characteristics of organizations, besides size  and
age,  in OE  models. That is,  it  should be recognized that  populations
are not very homogeneous. It  is here where 10 has something to offer




An  Intermediate Evaluation of Organizational Ecology
Hannan and Freeman started an ambitious and impressive research pro-
gramme in  1977 with the purpose of finding answers to fundamental)
questions such as ’why are there so many different kinds of organiza-
tions ?’  (Hannan and Freeman 1977) and ’what are  the  dynamics uf
modern economies, states, and societies?’ (Hannan and Carroll  1992).
Initially,  the  research  strategy  of mainstream OE has logically  been
one of searching for  ’general laws’.  For instance, concerning density
dependence and  its  resources,  Hannan and Carroll  (1992:  18)  argue
that  ’[o]ur primary argument ...  is  intended  to  apply to  all  kinds of
organizational populations. That  is, the theory applies to populations of
all types, in any time period, and in any society’. The same stance can
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be witnessed for other aspects of the theory such as  the  ‘liability  of
smallness’ and ’liability of newness’ hypotheses. This search for gener-
ality  implies  that  very  little  attention  has  been given  to  differences
between and within populations or industries. This observation relates,
of course, to the criticism raised in  the strategic management literature
discussed  in  the  previous section.  In  our view, OE can therefore be
classified as a general theory of similarities.
We  would  like to stress that there is nothing wrong  with such a research
strategy.  Moreover, despite  some inconsistent  findings  mentioned  in
the second section, the research findings of OE  are impressive indeed.
However, OE  only represents one side of the coin. We  agree with Car-
roll (1984: 90) that  ’[t]he future development of organizational theory
depends not on the dominance of one perspective, but on the welding
of the most important insights from various perspectives’.  It  is  in this
respect that we  think that both industrial organization and  the economic-
ally  inspired sub-field of strategic management (e.g. game theory and
competitor analysis,  respectively) are important candidates for cross-
fertilization. The reason is  twofold. First,  understanding the dynamics
of industrial evolution is an important topic on the research agenda of
both 10 and OE.  Therefore, they have a common  interest. Second, IO -
as opposed to OE -  focuses on differences betweert and within indus-
tries  (populations). Those differences seem to  be as  important as the
similarities (i.e. density dependence) stressed by OE, as will be discus-
sed below.
The Potential Contribution of Industrial Organization
We  stress in advance that the purpose of this paper is  not to develop
a general theory of  industrial evolution, but rather to illustrate important
areas for cross-fertilization between 10 and OE. It  will be argued that
10 and OE  are complementary. As  a result, insights from both theories
are  needed  to  understand  the  dynamics  of  populations.  Given  the
immense 10 literature on this subject, we will take the path-breaking
book of John Sutton (1991), Sunk Costs and  Market  Structure, as the
benchmark case. Sutton’s book is,  in a way, a summary of the current
state-of-the-art in modern 10. Our arguments are divided in two parts.
First,  differences between populations are explored. Then attention  is
focused on differences within industries.
Industrial Organization and Differences Between Industries
10 and a Number  of Striking Regularities
The nonmonotonic  density dependence in the vital rates can explain the
striking similarity of the growth trajectories of different organizational
populations. 10 scholars, however, have also discovered a number of
striking regularities. More  specifically, they observed  that ‘[t]he ranking
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of industries by concentration level  tends to be closely  similar from
one country to another: an industry that  is  dominated by a handful of
firms  in  one country is  likely  to be dominated by a  handful of firms
elsewhere too’ (Sutton 1991: 3). Dunne  et al. (1988) 
-  studying entry,
growth and exist in 387 four-digit U.S. manufacturing industries over
the period 1963-1982 
-  report another, related regularity.  It  appears
that entry and  exit patterns differ substantially across industries. In addi-
tion, they observe a high degree of correlation between entry and exit
rates across those industries. The differences in industry entry and exit
patterns even persist over time. Taken together, these findings clearly
demonstrate that  substantial, systematic heterogeneity  exists between
organizational populations and that some underlying characteristics of
industries  strongly constrain equilibrium structures (Sutton  1991; see
also Klepper and Graddy 1990).
While OE  can explain the  typical growth trajectory of populations,  it
has no answer to  important questions such as why certain  industries
remain fragmented while others become highly concentrated.2 More-
over, some industries seem to evolve towards a dual structure (Sutton
1991), whereas others do not. That is,  in some industries an expansion
of  the number  of firms can occur simultaneously with increases in con-
centration. The evolution of the Dutch audit market is a clear example
of the  latter pattern. Maijoor et  al.  (1993) collected historical data of
the (nearly) complete Dutch audit market from its inception, in the late
nineteenth century, to the present day. The  evolution of  the total number
of Dutch audit firms and of the  four-firm concentration ratio (Ca) -
which correlates almost perfectly with the Herfindahl-Hirschman index
over the whole period 
-  are depicted in Figures 1  and 2, respectively.
An important observation  is  that  the steady growth of the number of
audit  firms goes hand in  hand with  a  rapid increase  in  the  level  of
concentration. A  number of explanations for this peculiar evolution in
the Dutch audit industry will be offered in the fourth subsection (pp.
284-286).
Our  point is that mainstream OE  cannot account for these differences in
the evolution of  populations. The main  reason is that the theory of OE  is
solely based on numbers (i.e.  density), and thus neglects an important
aspect of  the size distribution of  firms, namely market  concentration.’ To
be sure, this argument can  be reversed with respect to 10, which  tends to
emphasize (but not to exclusively focus on) the properties of one tail of
the size distribution 
-  for instance, the market share held by the largest
four or eight firms (Hannan and Carroll  1992). A  theory of industry
dynamics should therefore incorporate both density and concentration.
We  will now  address  the question  of  why  such  differences  in the  evolution
of  industries (or populations) can be  observed.
Sutton (1991 ) on Differences Between Populations
The literature on 10 has been dominated in past decades by the applica-
tion of game  theory to competing firms in oligopolistic markets (Tirole














Source: Maijoor, Buijink, Van  Witteloostuijn and Zinken (1993).
1988). However, the results of those applications tend to depend deli-
cately upon the assumptions underlying the game design (Sutton 1991;
see for a defence, Shapiro 1989a). Hannan and Carroll (1992: 22) com-
ment  that ‘(the analytic results apparently lack robustness’. 10 scholars
have therefore focused their attention on specific markets. This allows
for adaptation of the oligopoly models to the requirements of the spe-
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cific  situation.  Of course,  this  ’ultra-micro  work’  (Sutton  1991:  6) I impedes understanding of the observed statistical  regularities between
industries. This observed lack of robustness is one of the main reasons
why  cross-fertilization  between  10  and  OE has  not  yet  occurred
(Hannan and Carroll  1992). The above characterization  is,  however,
partly beside the mark. For example, a number of contributions to the
Handbook of  Industrial Organization (Schmalensee and Willig 1989)
reports  theoretical  and  empirical  regularities  such  as  the  monopoly
enhancing impact of commitments (Gilbert 1989) and the thirty  ’styl-
ized facts’  (empirical regularities) from industry studies (Schmalensee
1989).  The  work  of Sutton (1991)  is  another  strong  case  in
point.
Sutton (1991) shows in his thought-provoking book that game theory
can be used  to develop robust  predictions concerning the level of  indus-
try concentration, which hold across a wide class of reasonable models
(and thus allow application to a broad set of different industries). Sut-
ton’s work is  the pièce de resistance of a  long tradition  in  10 that
studies the sunk investment-market competition nexus (Van Witteloos-
tuijn 1992). To  achieve robustness, some precision of prediction has to
.  be sacrificed for the breath of application. As a result, Sutton (1991)
analyzes the lower bound  to the equilibrium level of concentration as a
function of market size (S). Notice that the 10 concept of market size
is similar to the concept of carrying capacity in OE.
As opposed to OE, Sutton (1991) develops a general theory of differ-
ences between  industries.  More specifically,  he  makes a  distinction
between what Schmalensee (1992) calls Type I  and Type II  industries.
In the case of Type  I  markets, sunk costs are exogenous. That is,  setup
costs (6) have to be incurred by all entrants to start a business of min-
imum efficient  scale.  In  other words,  they  refer  to  the  presence  or
absence of economies of scale. An example of exogenous sunk costs
is investment in building a plant. Type II markets are characterized by
endogenous sunk costs. Endogenous sunk costs are choice variables to
firms, and refer to  advertising or R&D  outlays which are incurred to
’enhance  consumers’  willingness-to-pay  for  the  firm’s  product(s)’
(Sutton 1991: 8). According to Sutton (1991), the theory can be applied
to any form of sunk outlays that  increase consumers’ willingness-to-
pay. However, he focuses attention to advertising and not to R&D  out-
lays for the sake of  simplicity.’ Therefore, Type  II industries are charac-
terized  by high  advertising outlays  relative  to  sales.  The predictions
following from the theory are confronted with an in-depth investigation
of twenty food and drink product industries in  six countries.
Type I  markets can be divided into two subcases:  the homogeneous
goods industries and the horizontal product differentiation markets. The
former case reflects the standard Bertrand and Cournot theory of com-
petition  with  product homogeneity (Shapiro  1989b). The latter  case
stresses the fact that, even in the absence of strategic advertising and
R&D,  most goods are not very homogeneous 
-  as emphasized by, for
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instance,  location models of competition (Hotelling  1929; Eaton and
Lipsey 1989). This type of product differentiation can, for instance, be
the result of transportation costs, depending on the geographical loca-
tion  of suppliers,  or  some physical  difference  between the  products
offered by rivals. In both cases the theory predicts that (ceteris paribus)
the lower bound of concentration declines indefinitely, as the ratio of
market size to setup costs increases. What unifies both cases of Type
I markets is that sunk cost is exogenous, be it  in the form of investment
in  production technology (homogeneous goods) or geographical loca-
tion (horizontal product differentiation).
The main difference between the Type I  markets with homogeneous
goods  and  the Type  I markets  with  product  differentiation is that the latter
case, contrary to the former, is associated with multiple equilibria. The
game  theory  of  market  structure  with  free entry, product  homogeneity  and
exogenous  scale economies  (embodied  in a cost  function  that is associated
with  a fixed  production technology)  proves  that, ceteris paribus, the level
of scale  economies (or  the  size  of  the  minimum efficient  scale  of
operation) determines for each level of market demand  a unique number
of  firms  that can  viably operate in equilibrium (Baumol 1982). With  exo-
genous product differentiation, game-theoretic modelling reveals that a
plethora of  equilibria can  be  calculated. The  reason  is that, in a Hotelling-
type of setting, any equilibrium outcome between multi-product mono-
poly and single-product fragmented competition can occur (Eaton and
Lipsey 1989: 741). Therefore, in this case, the theory’s prediction is lim-
ited to the proposition that the lower bound on concentration (which is
the equilibrium with  single-product firms) declines to zero  as market  size
increases (Schmalensee 1992: 126).
The  ceteris paribus clause is important, as in any game-theoretic model.
Two examples may illustrate  this  point.  First,  equilibrium  values of
concentration depend upon the toughness of price competition. Sutton
(1991)  notes  that  as  price  competition  is  tougher,  the  equilibrium
number  of  firms will be correspondingly lower. The  intuition underlying
this phenomenon is  that  the  anticipation of a  tougher regime makes
entry  less  attractive,  thus  raising  equilibrium  concentration  levels.
Second, with horizontal product differentiation, the equilibrium level of
concentration will depend upon industry-specific influences, especially
when the ratio S/6 is  high. Although the theory is  less informative for
high S/6 ratios, regression analysis shows that,  as expected, the four-
firm concentration ratio of Type I  industries is  negatively related with
S/a. The regression coefficient of S/a  is statistically significant at the 5
percent level (for 32 Type I  industries). Sutton (1991: 121) reports that
’[a]  doubling in  S/6 implies a fall  of 13 percentage points in  C,;  the
corresponding equation for the logit formulation indicates that a doub-
ling of S/a implies a fall of 19 percentage points in C.,’. This confirms
the  theory  that  industries  characterized  by  high  setup  costs  (scale
economies) relative to market size will evolve towards a concentrated
structure with a small number of firms.
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The relation between the size of the market relative to setup costs (S/
0) on the one hand and the degree of concentration on the other,  as
described above, breaks down in Type II  markets. This prediction  is
based upon  the game-theoretic modelling  of  product differentiation with
endogenous sunk cost,  particularly  advertising modelling (Eaton and
Lipsey 1989). More specifically, concentration remains bounded away
from zero as market size increases. The reason offered by Sutton (1991:
11)  is  that  the  competitive escalation  of advertising outlays  in  such
industries  ’[r]alses  the  equilibrium  level  of sunk costs  incurred  by
incumbent firms in step with increases in the size of the market 
-  thus
offsetting  the  tendency  towards  fragmentation’.  Regression  analysis
indeed shows that there is no significant relationship between the size
of the market relative to setup costs (S/6) and the four-firm concentra-
tion ratio for 58 Type  II industries, as expected. It should be emphasized
that product differentiation in Type  I  markets and advertising intensity
in Type II markets really describe different cases. Although advertising
intensity is frequently related to highly differentiated products, differen-
tiation  can  occur  without  advertising.  Sutton  (1991:  78)  gives  the
example of the engineering industry,  ’[w]here many highly different-
iated  products are  sold primarily  to  industrial  buyers and for which
advertising levels are usually extremely low’.
The  difference between  the lower  bound  of  concentration as a function of
market size in homogeneous goods, product differentiation and advert-
ising intensive industries is summarized in Figure 3. Note that industry-
specific influences  (such  as the toughness  of  price  competition) may  move
the  curves  up  or  down,  and  that only  the homogeneous-goods  case  is asso-
ciated with a set of  unique equilibria (one for each value of  S). Figure 3
illustrates two  observations (Sutton 1991: 78): ’(1) The higher degree of
product differentiation per se will facilitate entry insofar as it  provides
new  niches  for potential entrants. This  is captured by  the leftward  shift of
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differentiation renders advertising more effective, this will tend to raise
concentration levels. This is captured by the upward shift in the lower
bound  at high  values  of  S.’ It should  be  mentioned  that an  increase  in setup
costs (6) also leads to an increase in the lower  bound  of  concentration in
the case of  endogenous  sunk  costs (Sutton 1991).
An important point  is  that Sutton’s theory  is  able to account for the
regular emergence of a dual structure in Type  II industries. Such a dual
structure is likely to occur when  customers  differ in their responsiveness
to advertising outlays. This  process  is clearly illustrated by the evolution
of the  frozen-food  industry  in  the  United  States,  which has  a  high
advertising to sales ratio and low  setup costs (6). In a detailed historical
account, Sutton (1991) shows  that the initially fragmented structure col-
lapsed due to  the escalating advertising outlays of a small number of
leading firms. (Note that Geroski and Vlassopoulos (1991) offer a sim-
ilar account of the history of the U.K. frozen-food industry.) Further-
more,  a  dual  structure  evolved because the  retail  sector  is  highly
responsive  to  those  advertising  outlays,  whereas  the  nonretail  part
of the market primarily buys on price. The competitive escalation of
advertising  necessarily  led  to  the  survival  of only  a  small  number
of relatively large firms in the retail sector. In the nonretail part of the
market, such concentration could not be observed. Instead, the nonretail
sector remained relatively fragmented, consisting of small, specialized
and nonadvertising firms.  It  is important to mention that the maximum
number of such  ’fringe’  firms  generally  depends on the  size  of the
nonretail (or nonadvertising) market and on the magnitude of the setup
costs. As the frozen-food industry is characterized by low setup costs
and a relatively large nonretail segment, a considerable number  of such
’fringe’ firms can be sustained (Sutton 1991).
It  is interesting to note that firms which were stuck between those two
segments  faced  declining  profitability  until  the  split  was achieved.
Sutton (1991:  182) also observes that  ‘(the smaller firms specializing
in the nonretail sales remained relatively profitable compared to those
firms of similar size that faced severe competition from the majors in
the  retail  segment,  where  profit  rates  were  strongly  and  positively
related to firm size’. The bottom line is that Sutton shows, both empiric-
ally  and theoretically,  that  a  dual  market structure 
-  with  a  small
number of large  market leaders and a  large  number of small  fringe
firms 
-  is a sustainable outcome. This result goes back to the theories
of Stackelberg competition (Dowrick 1986), where one firm takes the
lead in setting quantities or prices and models of dynamic  entry accom-
modation (Gelman and Salop 1983), where large firms profitably and
purposely tolerate small-firm entry.
A  Case  of Comparison: The German  and U.S. Brewing Industries
Sutton (1991) also analyzes  a more complex  case where both exogenous
and endogenous sunk costs are  high:  the U.S. brewing industry. The
brewing industry became highly concentrated during the post-war dec-
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ades. In 1934, more  than 700  breweries were  in operation. By 1985, 97.7
percent of industry  sales was realized by seven firms.  The top two,
Anheuser-Bush  and  Miller, alone accounted  for a combined  market  share
of 60 percent (Sutton  1991: 289). According to Sutton, this evolution
cannot  be  explained by  increases  in the minimum  efficient scale of  opera-
tion (scale economies)  alone. It is the result of  the complex  interaction of
exogenous  sunk  costs and  the  escalation  of  advertising  outlays  of  the lead-
ing breweries (endogenous sunk  costs). In this respect, it  is interesting to
note that the German  brewing  industry remained  rather fragmented com-
pared  with  the U.S. brewing  industry. Carroll et al. (1993: 158)  report  that
123  brewers  were  operating  in the United  States in 1988, whereas  in Ger-
many  the number  of  producers amounted  to 1,192. Sutton argues (1991  -.
301)  that only the U.S. brewing  industry satisfies the two assumptions  ut
his analysis, as ‘[t]he evolution of  structure was  left to market  forces, and
the effectiveness of advertising was not blunted by the presence of  ties
between  producers  and  outlets’. Sutton (1991: 300)  comments  as follows:
’In Germany,  as in the United Kingdom,  the tying  of  retail outlets to par-
ticular brewers again blunts the effectiveness of  advertising. Long-term
contracts between the brewer and the retail outlets guarantee the brewer
exclusive supply rights.  In  addition to the existence of the  tie,  heavy
restrictions on television advertising further increase the difficulties  in
establishing national brands’.
Two  possible outcomes are associated with such escalating advertising
outlays as in thc U.S. brewing industry: exit of second-tier firms or the
eventual development  of  a dual structure (as in the frozen-food industry)
(Sutton 1991). These  processes, suggested by Sutton, are consistent with
recent empirical findings in the OE  tradition. First, Boeker (1991) ana-
lyzes the growth  in sales volume of  national, regional and local brewers
at the U.S. state level for the period 1962-1979. He  finds that growth  in
national brewers induced declines in  regional and local brewers. This
competition effect is especially pronounced  for the regional brewers. The
latter result suggests that medium-sized regional brewers are more vul-
nerable to the escalation of  advertising  outlays  of  leading (national) com-
panies. Second, recent developments in the U.S. brewing industry seem
to reveal an evolution towards a dual structure. More  specifically, in the
last 15 years, two  new  types  of  brewers  have  emerged  in the United  States:
’The first of  these, the so-called microbrewery, produces  ale and  beer by
traditional methods for  a  small but upscale niche  in  the  market. The
second form, commonly  referred to as the brewpub,  sells malt beverages
directly to the consumer  for immediate  consumption  at the site of  produc-
tion’ (Hannan and Carroll  1992:  156). The density of both types grew
rapidly. It is clear  that those brewers  focus  on the nonadvertising  segment
of  the market, which  is precisely what  the endogenous  sunk  cost model  of
Sutton predicts. Whether  this emergent  dual structure can be sustained in
the long run remains to be seen, and depends  upon, among  other things,
the size (or carrying capacity) of  this nonadvertising segment. Note that
the mixed  case 
-  with both exogenous and endogenous sunk  cost 
-  is
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associated with a dual structure revealing a Type  I  market niche and  a
Type  II market  segment.
There  is an  exciting  similarity between  the dual structure theory of  Sutton
(1991) and  an OE  theory, namely  the resource partitioning model  of  Car-
roll (1985). The model of Carroll applies to industries with strong eco-
nomies of scale (i.e.  high 6  in the terminology of Sutton) (Hannan and
Carroll  1992). The theory makes a distinction between generalists and
specialists: ’Populations that depend on a wide range of environmental
resources for survival are known  as generalists .... In contrast, popula-
tions  that  survive  in  a  specific environmental condition  (or within a
narrow  range of environmental resources) are called specialists’ (Carroll
1985: 1266). Examples  of generalists  are large daily newspaper  organiza-
tions and national breweries. Small newspaper organizations focusing
on a specific segment of the market, microbreweries and brewpubs are
typical specialists.
When  scale economies dominate, large generalists in a population com-
pete to occupy  the centre of  the market. This competitive process causes
concentration in  the  ’mass market’, which opens up small pockets of
resources  that are likely to be used by  small  specialists. The  resource par-
titioning theory therefore predicts that increased concentration among
generalists increases  the failure rate of  large generalists and  decreases  the
failure rate of small specialists (Carroll 1985; Baum  and Mezias 1992).
Baum and Mezias (1992: 583) argue that  the  ’[r]esource partitioning
’  model suggests one possible basis for Hannan and Freeman’s specifica-
tion  of  size-localized  competition:  Large  organizations  capture  the
advantages  of  generalism, small organizations the advantages  of  special-
ism, and middle-sized organizations the liabilities of both’.5 The evid-
ence, although  scarce, supports  the resource  partitioning model  in the U.S.
newspaper  market  (Carroll 1985) and  the U.S. brewing  industry (Hannan
and  Carroll 1992). In the latter case, the four-firm concentration ratio has
a positive effect on the founding rates of microbreweries and brewpubs,
and  a negative effect on  the mortality rate of  microbreweries  (not enough
mortality  data  were  available  for  brewpubs)  (Hannan  and  Carroll
1992).
Notice that both theories are similar to the description of competitive
social  processes  by  Hawley  (1950):  ’Following  Durkheim,  Hawley
argued  that finite environmental  resources  set the conditions for competi-
tion. As  competition proceeds, selective pressures push less fit compet-
itors out of  the market. When  these competitors exit from their previous
niches, they become  differentiated through either territorial or functional
transformation. As  Hawley  emphasizes,  the final outcome  of  competition
is a more complex  division of  labour, characterized by  primarily symbi-
otic relations between  social units’ (Carroll 1985: 1278). In other words,
competition  leads  to heterogeneity instead  of  homogeneity  within  popula-
tions, due to lateral migrations into a neighbouring market niche (for an
economic account on differentiation due to competition see Lippman  et
al.  1991). There is,  however, a  subtle difference between the above-
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mentioned theories concerning the fundamental nature of competitive
processes. More  specifically, Carroll (1985)  rejects the process  suggested
by Hawley  that differentiation is mainly the result of  the transformation
of losing competitors. Instead, Carroll (1985) assumes that the replace-
ment  of losing (failing) competitors by differentiated units coming  from
new  sources  (i.e. entry) causes  differentiation. Sutton’s theory allows  for
both mechanisms  to operate. That  is, a dual structure can be the result of
both exit (and replacement) and lateral  migration towards the  ’fringe’
of  the market.
The  main  difference between  the theory of  Sutton  (1991)  and  the resource
partitioning model of Carroll (1985) is  that,  in our view, the former is
more informative than the latter as to the specification of conditions in
which resource partitioning is likely to occur. The applicability of the
model  of  Carroll is limited to the standard case of  exogenous sunk  costs
(scale economies). Resource  partitioning  is likely to occur  in Type  I mar-
kets 
-  more  specifically, the horizontal product differentiation subcase.
The  latter condition  is necessary,  because  partitioning  cannot  be  observed
without some heterogeneity of resource bases (e.g.  different tastes of  I
customers). Sutton’s  theory, however,  extends  this prediction  by showing
that such  a dual  structure  regularly appears  in advertising-intensive  indus-
tries (i.e. Type  II industries), even in the absence of  scale economies  (an
example being the frozen-food industry). In any case, both theories can
account  for the fact that in some  industries  the levels  of  concentration  and
density  rise simultaneously.
A  Second Case  in Point: The Dutch Audit Industry
There remains, however, a problem in explaining the evolution of the
Dutch audit industry (Figures 1  and 2). This industry is neither charac-
terized by the existence of scale economies (high S/6 ratio) nor by a
high advertising to sales ratio. One possibility  is  that the evolution of
the Dutch audit industry is caused by industry-specific factors (such as
government regulation). Another possibility  is  that  a mechanism, not
captured by Sutton’s or Carroll’s theory, has induced this pattern:  i.e.
increasing concentration at the demand side. Below, both possibilities,
which will appear to be closely related, are briefly discussed.
A  first determinant of the Dutch audit industry structure is government
regulation that stimulates demand  for audit services. A  number  of laws
enforced audit requirements upon large parts of Dutch business life. By
way  of illustration, two post-1970 regulatory measures are worth men-
tioning  (Maijoor  and  Van  Witteloostuijn  1993).  A first  regulation
imposed mandatory audit requirements and detailed disclosure rules on
laige firms in  1971, implying that  all  public companies, large private
firms and large cooperatives had to disclose audited annual accounts. A
second  regulatory measure  was  introduced  in 1983. Under  this new  legis-
lation  all  public  companies,  private firms  and  cooperatives, whatever  their  z
size, are obliged to disclose (abridged) annual accounts.
The  second  explanatory  variable  is  client  concentration.  DeAngelo  I
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(1981) and Benston (1985) argue that large company clients can only
be served (efficiently) by large audit firms. Dutch industry concentration
was relatively stable up until the 1960s. Then, a number of acquisition
and merger waves induced a substantial increase of the concentration
level (De Jong 1988). Hence, as the 1971 regulation forced an increased
demand  for the services of  lar-ge audit firms, audit market  concentration
started to rise in the 1970s (Figure 2: from a C4 of 0.36 in 1970 to a C,,
of 0.53 in 1982) without a significant increase of density (Figure 1:  the
number of audit firms is 306 in  1970 and 320 in  1982). The effect of
the 1983 regulation is the opposite: audit market concentration remained
relatively stable (the C4 falling from 0.53 in  1983 to 0.46 in 1988, and
rising again to 0.59 in  1990) with substantially increased density (from
a total of 320 audit firms in 1982 to 505 in  1990). The explanation is
that the 1983 regulation generated a massive increase of demand from
small and medium-sized  clients for the audit services of  relatively small
audit firms. To  sum  up: the 1971 regulation increased the carrying capa-
city of the large audit-firm niche, whereas the 1983 measure did so for
the  small audit-firm segment. The end result  is,  again,  a dual market
structure. This pattern supports the predictions of Carroll’s (1985) and
Sutton’s (1991) theories. The underlying mechanism is,  however, dif-
ferent. The long-run evolution of the Dutch audit industry suggests that
the structure of  the supply side of  the market may  be (partly) determined
by the demand-side structure of the market.
This said,  the result comes as no surprise. OE  scholars have an open
eye for the influence of government regulation on density (Hannan and
Carroll 1992), which  is clear from  their interest to integrate institutional
theory into their argument (Zucker 1989; Baum  and Oliver 1991). How-
ever, the case of the Dutch audit industry indicates that the impact on
concentration cannot be ignored either. An  account of  the history of  the
underlying political decision-making processes reveals a second point:
much regulation is  (at  least partly) endogenous rather than exogenous
to the industry. Both regulatory measures have been prepared by gov-
ernment-installed commissions with  important  representatives of the
audit profession (Maijoor and Van Witteloostuijn  1993).  In  the case
of the Dutch audit industry, effective lobbying has been an important
determinant of  government  intervention. This observation is in line with
the economic theory of rent seeking (Lindahl 1987). The Dutch audit
industry  has  a  long  history  of  institutionalized  interest  promotion,
including  lobbying  activities  (De Vries  1985).  An illustrative  quote
from the minutes of a large professional association of Dutch auditors
is  that ’the organization will  act  in  the  interest  of its  members and
assistants ... striving for legal regulation of the profession’.
In fact, the case of  the Dutch  audit industry can be seen as an additional
illustration 
-  next to advertising and R&D -  of Sutton’s claim that
any type of sunk investment that enhances the consumers’ willingness,
to pay for the firm’s product(s) can be captured in his Type II  market
setting.  In the Dutch audit industry,  the  clients’  willingness-to-pay  is
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increased as a result of demand regulations that came into being after
the industry invested (and still  does invest) sunk costs in decade-long
lobbying activities. However, an additional subtlety must be mentioned.
The enforced audit requirements stimulate demand  at the industry level.
Hence, this increase of the population’s carrying capacity may induce
entry and so decrease concentration. However, this  is  not what hap-
pened in  the Dutch audit industry for two reasons (Maijoor and Van
Witteloostuijn  1993).  First,  the  dual  structure  at  the  demand side  is
reflected  in  the dominance of large  firms at  the  supply side  (see  the
argument above). Second, the demand  regulations have been backed by
a monopolized licensing regime which regulates the supply side. That
is, by law, only the professional body NIvRA  (Nederlallds  Instituut van
Register-Accountants), which has held  the  monopoly since  1967, has
the jurisdiction to license new  auditors. Hence, the profession is able to
regulate the entry process so as to protect the rents that follow from  the
law-enforced demand increase.
.  I  ....
Implications for Organizational Ecology
A  number  of implications follows from the arguments made above. By
way of illustration, we discuss five below. 
, 
z
Implication 1: density and  concentration.  Hannan and Carroll (1992:
48) observe [t ]hat trends in density often coincide at least roughly with
those of concentration. When  the number  of firms declines, the market
share  held by the  largest  few firms often increases’.  The discussion
presented in this paper makes clear  that the word roughly should be
stressed, and that many counter-examples can be found. Therefore, a
theory of population dynamics must take into account both density and
concentration. The resource partitioning model of Carroll ( 1985,  1987)
is a rare exception. Integrating 10 and OE  offers the possibility of ana-
lyzing competition beyond the one-dimensional numbers (density) or
concentration perspective of OE  and 10, respectively.
Implication 2: inditsti-v heterogeneity.  We  believe OE  can make con-
siderable  progress  by  taking  into  account  systematic  difference;
between industries. In this respect, 10 can be very informative, as the
theory of Sutton (1991) shows. Several OE  scholars have argued that
the development of the field requires a science of  organizational classi-
fication and taxonomy (see Carroll  1984, for a discussion). McKelvey
and  Aldrich (1983: 125) argue that ‘[at theoretically grounded empirical
taxonomy would provide a conceptual framework for describing and
understanding the  diversity  of organizational  populations, and would 
I
identify populations useful for research on other substantive concerns
about organizations’. In our view, the work  of Sutton 
-  stressing inter
alia the importance of advertising 
-  is  an important step forward in
the  development of a  useful  categorization of organizational popula-
tions.  Such work allows OE  researchers to (1) reconciliate discrepant
findings,  (2)  explain  differences  in  the  strength  of effects,  and  (3)  I
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identify the limits of generalization and therefore to increase the preci-
sion of prediction.
To illustrate points  1  and 2, we focus our attention on the findings of
Carroll et al. (1993), who  compared  the dynamics of the U.S.- with the
German brewing industry. Recall that escalation of advertising outlays
occurred  in  the  U.S.  brewing  industry  but  not  in  Germany (Sutton
1991). Carroll et  al.  (1993) find ’[tjhat the same environmental forces
sometimes produced different  effects  in  these  contexts’  (point  1 ).  A
very peculiar  finding,  not  dealt with by Carroll  et  al.  (1993),  is  the
divergent effect of the carrying capacity (measured as the size of the
residential population) on both the founding and mortality rates in the
U.S.- and German brewing industry. More specifically, in the German
brewing industry the founding rate significantly increases and the mor-
tality rate significantly decreases with an increase in the carrying capa-
city. This  result, of  course, is as expected. However,  in the U.S. brewing
industry the findings are precisely the opposite. That is,  an increase in
carrying capacity is significantly associated with a decrease in founding
rates and an increase in mortality rates.  It  is likely that the latter pattern
is the result of the escalation of advertising outlays of the leading U.S.
brewing  companies. If the benefits of an increasing demand  only accrue
to-advertising firms, it can be understood that second-tier breweries are
pushed out of the  market,  and therefore  the  mortality  rate  rises.  As
the escalation of advertising increases the endogenous sunk costs, the
founding rate is also depressed.
Carroll et al. (1993) also report that the vital rates of both the U.S. and
German brewing industry are nonmonotonically related to population
density,  as  expected.  However, they  observe  large  variations  in  the
strength  of  the  density-dependent  evolution  in  the  American  and
German brewery industries (point 2). The authors report, for instance,
that  ’[t]hough the estimate of density dependency in  the  age-specific
mortality rate of German  breweries is nonmonotonic, the mortality rate
continues to decline with density over the entire range, suggesting the
dominance of the density-dependent legitimation process’ (Carroll et al.
1993:  181). This is not the case for the U.S. brewing industry, where
the  mortality rate  increases rapidly after  a density of 1,526 has been
reached (the maximum observed density being 2,550). These findings
clearly show that the competition effect has been more pronounced in
the  U.S.  brewing industry.  We speculate  that  this  difference  in  the
strength of effects can be ascribed, at least in part, to differences in the
escalation of advertising outlays.
In our view, 10 has high potential in helping to determine the limits of
generalization of OE  predictions (point  3). As  a result, more  precise pre-
dictions can  be made  concerning  the dynamics  of  populations. In the pre-
vious  section we  already discussed the contribution of  the work  of  Sutton
(1991) relating to the applicability of the resource partitioning model.
Similarly, the theory of  Sutton  allows  one  to make  differential predictions
concerning  the ‘liability of  smallness’.’  It can  be expected  that the mono-
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tonically declining  relationship between  size and  failure rate will be most
pronounced in Type I  industries characterized by scale economies and
homogeneous products. However, it  is  likely  that,  at  the onset of the
escalation  of  advertising  outlays, the relationship between  size and  failure
becomes nonmonotonic: i.e.,  the failure rate of medium-sized firms is
higher than the failure rate of  large and small firms. In other words, we
expect size-localized  competition to be more pronounced in  Type II
industries. As  another example, we  hypothesize that industry concentra-
tion is positively related with the mortality rates of  small firms in Type  I
industries  (selling homogeneous  goods),  but not  in Type  II industries. The
frozen-food industry is a potential candidate to test these predictions, as
its  development is very well-documented (Sutton 1991). Note, finally,
that a  differentiated perspective on  the liability of  smallness’ hypothesis
is supported by game-theoretic models  of  exit (Ghemawat  and Nalebuff
1985, 1990; Whinston 1988).
Implication 3: endogenous carrying capacity.  The endogenous sunk-
costs model implies that  the carrying capacity  itself  is  endogenously
determined 
-  rather than being exogenous to the theory, as postulated
by OE.  This  is what  differentiates Type  II markets from Type  I markets:
strategic sunk-investment stimulates the consumers’ willingness-to-pay
for  the  firm’s  product(s). A  well-established  result in 10  is that advertising
is both  a  private and  public good  (Comanor  and  Wilson 1979). The  public
good  nature of  advertising  implies  that the promotion  efforts of  individual
firms may well raise industry demand (Roberts and Samuelson 1988).
Another case in point are advertising campaigns that are organized by
industrial  associations. Two recent examples in  The Netherlands are
national television ads for milk and notaries, and in Belgium for cheese
and  textiles 
-  in all cases  without any  reference  to brand  or  office names.
Note  that such stimulation of industry demand  may  decrease rather than
increase concentration if the increased carrying capacity induces entry.
The  case of  the Dutch  audit industry (pp. 284-286)  offers a second  mech-
anism  that endogenizes  carrying  capacity: lobbying  practices  for demand-
enhancing government regulation.  Moreover, the events in  the Dutch
audit industry reveal that industry lobbying for demand regulation may
increase concentration if backed by supply-restricting measures (in this
case a monopolized  licensing regulation).
Implication  4:  advertising,  lobbying  and legitimation.  The  fourth
implication for OE,  closely related to the third implication, concerns the
importance of advertising and lobbying as ways to obtain legitimacy.
According to Hannan and Carroll  (1992:  21),  ’[legitimation  has no
recognizable  counterpart  within  economic theory’.  As Implication  3
reveals, this observation is clearly beside the mark. Apart from industry
legitimation, 10 stresses the fact that legitimation processes also occur
at the  firm level. In other words, firms try to increase consumers’ will-
ingness-to-pay  for their product(s) by advertising outlays. Therefore,
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legitimation processes at both the population and firm level should be
considered simultaneously. Similarly, the economic theory of lobbying
describes a legitimation mechanism.
Implication 5: time dependence.  A  final, and related, implication con-
cerns the  generality of OE  theory over different time periods.  Recall
that the theory according to Hannan and Carroll (1992) is  intended to
apply to any time period. We seriously  doubt this  general  postulate.
Hitherto  the  majority  of OE findings  were based on  organizational
populations  existing  at  least  100 years.  The work of Sutton (1991),
however, more than suggests that in several populations the competitive
situation changed dramatically after the Second World War, due to the
rapid  diffusion  of  television  with  the  accompanying  escalation  of
advertising  campaigns.  This  evolution  has  two  implications  for  the
dynamics of Type II industries.
First,  it  is  likely  that within  ’old’  Type II  markets, the dynamics of
industry evolution changed dramatically after the Second World War.
Some indirect  evidence can be found in  Hannan and Carroll (1992).
They studied the effect of left-truncated observation schemes on non-
monotonic density dependence in  the  vital  rates of the  U.S. brewing
industry. Left-truncation occurs when the early history of a population
is  not included in  the  data set 
-  as in  the study of Delacroix et  al.
(1989), for instance. Hannan and Carroll (1992) find the expected den-
sity-dependent  effects  for  the  full  history  of the  population  (1633-
1988). However, for the left-truncated period ( 1940-1988), they report
that ‘[t]he effects of density on the founding rate now run opposite the
predictions of the  theory and differ greatly from those  of the  entire
period. So do the effects of density on the mortality rate’ (Hannan and
Carroll  1992:  165).  Of course,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  density-
dependent legitimacy effect, which occurs in the early history of  a popu-
lation, cannot be observed in a left-truncated observation scheme. How-
ever,  it  remains odd that  the  competition  effects  of density  on  the
founding and mortality rates change so dramatically. The competition
effect on the founding rate even has the opposite sign. In any case, OE
scholars should incorporate the post-war period as a covariate in models
of Type  II  industries.
The second implication of the  ‘television  era’  is  that data are needed
on Type II  industries with an early history starting approximately after
the Second World War  (e.g. the frozen-food industry). It is not unlikely
that, in such industries, legitimation processes at the firm level will be
more important than those at the population level. That is,  the density-
dependent legitimation effect may  have been replaced by the escalation
of endogenous sunk (advertising) costs.
Industrial Organization and Differences Within Industries
Mainstream  OE  has  been  inclined to  treat all organizations  within  a popu-
lation as  equivalent. The  fitness  set theory of  Hannan  and  Freeman  (1977)
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concerning  the survival chances  of  generalists  versus  specialists in differ-
ent environments is of  course an  exception. However,  this aspect of OE
theory has not been researched enough according  to Singh and Lumsden
(1990), who report only two studies in which the fitness set theory is
empirically  verified. Furthermore,  it should  be mentioned  that OE  models
do  account  for differences  in size and  age. In 10, the notion  of  firm  hetero-
geneity is firmly embedded  in the literature, as the studies on leader-fol-
lower  oligopolies and dominant  firms show  (Caves  et al.  1984).
From the  discussion  in  the previous sections,  it  immediately follows
that organizations within populations differ in many respects, besides
size and age 
-  for instance,  in  terms of the  level of advertising and
R&D  outlays. Incorporating such differences in OE  studies is important
for  two reasons.  First,  recall  that  the  main interest  of OE is  not  so
much in  explaining the vital  rates per se, but rather in  understanding
the implications of  mortality and founding processes for the distribution 
I of  organizational characteristics (i.e. diversity, see pp. 266-270). There-
fore, the understanding of organizational diversity can be enhanced by
gaining insight into the effects of organizational characteristics on the
vital rates. Second, such an approach has the potential to bridge the gap
between OE  scholars and strategic management researchers who  focus
on organizational-level analysis (Baum and Mezias 1992).
Recently,  several  scholars  have made insightful  contributions  to  the
literature  by analyzing the  consequences of intrapopulation  variation
(Boeker 1988,  1991; Barnett 1990; Swaminathan and Delacroix 1991;
Baum  and Mezias 1992). In this respect, the study of Baum  and Mezias
(1992)  is  path-breaking. These authors study the  impact of localized
competition on rates of failure  in  the  Manhattan hotel  industry from
1898 to 1990. They argue that ‘[a]ll organizations in a population may
not compete for the same scarce resources or contribute to and experi-
ence competition equally.  If all  organizations in  a population are  not
equal competitors, then population density may not provide the most
precise measure of  the competition faced by different organizations in a
population. Considering organizational differences more explicitly may
therefore  facilitate  understanding  the  competitive  dynamics  within
organizational populations’ (Baum and Mezias 1992: 580). The ’stra-
tegic’  variables incorporated  in  their  analysis are organizational size,
geographic location and price. The main finding of their study  is  that
hotels located in densely-populated regions of the distributions of size,
location and price have significantly higher failure rates. These findings
clearly  show the  importance of identifying  ’strategic  groups’  within
populations (see also Boeker 1991).
The potential for cross-fertilization between OE  and the economically
inspired sub-field of  strategic management has already been thoroughly
explored by Baum  and Mezias (1992) and Boeker  (1991), as the above
discussion reveals. Therefore, the following discussion will be limited
to a brief summary  of  a number  of additional areas of  cross-fertilization
with 10.
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Fir-st,  the  above mentioned concept of strategic groups has received
considerable attention  in  the 10 literature.  Strategic group research  is
of course closely related with the development of strategic typologies.
In our view, the 10 typologies are somewhat  richer than the simple OE
distinction between specialism and generalism.’ For instance, Porter’s
(1980) well-known taxonomy  distinguishes three strategies: cost leader-
ship,  differentiation  and focus.  It  is  clear that focus  is  similar to  the
OE concept of specialism.  However, there  is  no OE counterpart  for
cost leadership and differentiation. Two examples of other interesting
10 typologies are presented by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and Bulow
et  al.  (1985).
It  is important to stress that focusing  attention on  organizational strategy
does not imply that organizations are relatively flexible. Strategic group
scholars emphasize the existence of mobility barriers between strategic
groups (Caves and Porter 1977). This  is consistent with the OE  assump-
tion of relative inertia. For instance, in a recent study of the U.S. insur-
ance industry from 1970 to  1984 Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1993: 69)
find  that  ’[a]  low level  of firm  mobility ...  exists between strategic
groups consistent with the presence of inertia and mobility barriers’. A
second case  in  point  is  the  commitment notion, which  is  crucial  in
the game-theoretic models in 10 on strategic competition (Dixit 1982;
Ghemawat 1991): only irreversible investment 
-  which by the defini-
tion of  commitment  implies reduced  flexibility 
-  can operate as a cred-
ible strategic move.
’ 
Second,  the  ‘stuck  in  the  middle’  theory  of Porter (1980)  is  highly
consistent with the concept of  localized competition, and therefore also
with resource partitioning and dual structure theory (Baum and Mezias
1992). Porter (1980: 42) speculates that ’[i]n some industries, the prob-
lem of getting caught in the middle may  mean  that the smaller (focused
or differentiated) firms and the largest (cost leadership) firms are more
profitable,  and  the  medium-sized  firms  are  the  less  profitable.  This
implies a U-shaped  relationship between  profitability and market share’.
The industry conditions in which such a relationship is  likely to hold,
have been discussed earlier in this section. Note, again, that a universal
law is unlikely to prevail, as under particular circumstances a ’stuck in
the middle’ strategy may  well be sustainable (Miller and Friesen 1986a,
1986b).
Third,  and  finally,  more  attention  should  be  given  to  ’first-mover
advantages’. The reason  is  that  first-mover advantages may have an
important impact on the dynamics of industry evolution. This issue has
a long tradition in 10 (Gilbert 1989). Sutton (1991) explores the influ-
ence of such a  strategic asymmetry between early  entrants and firms
that enter later on the industry equilibrium structure. A  qualitative and
exploratory analysis of three Type II  industries (soup, margarine and
soft drinks) suggests that the presence or absence of  first-mover advant-
ages may explain, at  least in part, the divergence of industry structure
from one  country  to  another.  Consider,  for  instance,  the  margarine
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market. Sutton (1991) argues that Unilever had a first-mover advantage
in the European market but not in the U.S. market. This difference may
explain why the U.S. market became much more fragmented than the
European market. More generally, this  illustrates how path-dependent
idiosyncracies  early  in  the  history  of otherwise equal  industries  can
explain diverging concentration  patterns. An important  type of these
idiosyncracies  are  the  early  strategies  pursued (which are  10’s  first-
mover advantages) by major players in an industry.
Appraisal
The current  state-of-the-art  in  OE is  impressive  indeed.  Study  after
study confirms the predicted regularities across organizational popula-
tions and over time periods. The still  increasing number of studies is
increasingly seeking input from adjacent traditions in organization stud-
ies,  notably institutional  theory (Baum and Oliver 1991) and strategy
research (Boeker 1991). The paper of Baum and Mezias (1992) is  a
path-breaking contribution to OE  because this study is largely inspired
by 10 theory. In our view, this type of cross-fertilization holds the key
to  the  future by combining OE’s emphasis on long-run data analysis
with  the  analytical  rigour of 10. The above argument has hopefully
succeeded in  communicating this  message. A  particularly interesting
line of investigation is to integrate OE’s  focus on similarities with IO’s
concentration on differences. A  full-fletched theory of the behaviour of
(populations of) organizations needs both perspectives.
This potential for cross-fertilization is  not restricted to first-level stud-
ies,  focusing on the dynamics of, and within, one particular organiza-
tional  population  only.  Carroll’s  (1985,  1987)  resource  partitioning
model  and  Boeker’s  (1991)  study  of  intra-population  competition
among strategic groups point the way to second-level contributions to
OE. Here,  again, much can be  learned from a  long tradition  in  10.
Worth  mentioning  are the studies on diversification strategies (Hamilton
1992; Nayyar 1992) and multimarket competition (Van Wegberg and
Van  Witteloostuijn 1992; Van Witteloostuijn and Van Wegberg 1992).
Anyway,  whether the study is one of  intra- or interpopulation evolution,
cross-fertilization  is  likely  to  increase  the  survival  rate  of  OE
theory.
Notes * We gratefully acknowledge the comments of Hans Pennings and two referees. The
usual disclaimer applies. Parts of the first three sections are based upon Schreuder and
Van Witteloostuijn (1990), which was presented at  the  10th E.G.O.S  Conference in
Vienna (1991).
1.  If  determinism  is  interpreted  in  this  way,  then  every  sociological  theory  of
organizations is deterministic (Hannan and Freeman 1989). Singh and Lumsden (1990:
185) observe that ’if anything, pre-ecological organizational research has tended to take
the deterministic view of organizational evolution (for example, the contingency theory
of  the  1960s  and  1970s),  and  the  ecological  research  has  attended  more  to  its
probabilistic and dynamic nature’.
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2.  Hannan  and  Carroll  (1992)  and  Hannan and  Freeman  (1989)  argue  that  10  is
primarily interested in equilibrium outcomes, whereas OE addresses the dynamics of
populations. Their characterization of IO is  beside the mark, however, as they attack
a self-created strawman. First, there is much disequilibrium and dynamic work  in IO 
&mdash;
as  is  clear from,  for example, the studies of innovation and technology (Dosi  1988)
and dynamic game theory (Fudenberg and Tirole  1991).  Second, they misunderstand
the nature of equilibrium theory, which only proxies reality by focusing on a series of
temporary  equilibria  that  may  well  generate  intertemporal  disequilibrium  (Van
Witteloostuijn and Maks 1990). Third, and related to the second remark, even if their
observation  would be  correct,  we think  that  a  dynamic theory  cannot  neglect  the
empirical fact  that  the  ’mode of competition’ differs  substantially between industries
(Sutton  1991).
3.  There are several notable exceptions to this observation. More specifically, Carroll
(1985, 1987) develops a theory of resource partitioning within populations, which can
account for the evolution of  a dual industry structure (see pp. 281-284  for a discussion).
It  should  be  stressed,  however,  that  these  studies  are  highly  exceptional  within
mainstream OE.
4.  For the sake of space limitation, we will do so as well. Dosi (1988) and Cohen and
Levin (1989) are two revealing reviews of the R&D-innovation-technology  literature
in economics.
5.  Hannan  and  Freeman’s  (1977)  size-localized  competition  model  states  that
competition within populations  is  localized  along the  organizational  size  axis.  More
specifically,  similarly-sized  organizations compete most  intensely  because  large  and
small  organizations  depend  on  different  resource  mixes:  ’As  a  result,  large
organizations will pose a threat to medium-sized but not small organizations and vice
versa.  Therefore,  the  emergence of large organizations should be accompanied by a
decline in the number  of medium-sized organizations, while small ones flourish as their
most intense competitors are removed from the environment’ (Baum and Mezias 1992:
582).
6.  Although the  ’liability  of smallness’ seems to  hold  in  several  populations, some
findings are  inconclusive (Singh and Lumsden 1990). Wholey et  al.  (1992:  829), for
instance,  find among U.S.  Health Maintenance Organizations that  ’[c]ontrary  to  the
typical monotunically declining relationship between organization size and failure rates
found  in  ecology  research,  we  show  that  this  relationship  varies  by  type  of
organization’. The general pattern in  IO studies on the size of failing firms supports
OE’s claims on  the  liabilities  of  size  and  age  (Dunne  et  al.  1989),  though  again
exceptions have been reported (Lieberman 1990). Note that the  ’liability of newness’
hypothesis  has  been  modified  by  the  introduction  of  the  ’liability  of adolescence’
argument (Bruderl and Sch&uuml;ssler  1990; Fichman and Levinthal  1991).
7.  We  acknowledge  that  OE  also  introduces  a  third  strategy  type,  namely
polymorphists (Freeman and Hannan 1983). Pulymorphists combine multiple specialiat
units. However, we  are not aware of  any study in which the latter type has been studied
empirically. Note that the very nature of the polymorphist points to the  interface with
the diversification literature  in  IO. We  refer to  this  issue in the last  section.
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